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CRIMINAL FORFEITURE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
UNDER RICO AND CCE
LINCOLN STONE*
[I]llegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing
* . . by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes
of procedure.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
Criminal forfeiture is a sanction imposed to dispossess
persons of property by reason of some wrongdoing. On the
theory that forfeiture of the assets involved in crime disturbs
the economic power base of criminal organizations, Congress
has declared criminal forfeiture statutes to be integral to gov-
ernment's battle against criminal racketeering and drug traf-
ficking. In this regard, through the Comprehensive Forfei-
ture Act of 1984,1 Congress amended criminal forfeiture
provisions of both the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations statute' (RICO) and the Continuing Criminal En-
terprise statute3 (CCE) to provide clearer authority for law
enforcement to pursue forfeiture of assets. The 1984 Act au-
thorizes, for example, government forfeiture of the proceeds
of criminal activity and, in some instances without prior no-
tice or hearing, court-sanctioned pre-trial restraints on prop-
erty in order to guarantee its availability for forfeiture upon
conviction of the defendant. At the same time, however, the
1984 Act directs the government to comply with certain pro-
cedures designed to protect persons with adverse interests.
For instance, the government must submit to a post-trial
hearing the question whether a criminal forfeiture verdict
operates to divest petitioning third parties of their interest in
the forfeited property.
Any long-term success derived by law enforcement from
* B.A. 1983, Loyola Marymount University; J.D. 1986, University of
Notre Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1984-86.
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.)
2040 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1963, 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853-855).
2. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, tit. 9, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
84 Stat. 922 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982)).
3. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, tit. 2,
Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
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the use of forfeiture under the 1984 Act depends not only on
how regularly forfeiture is pursued, but also on how well pro-
cedures of the 1984 Act protect defendants and interested
parties with valid objections to forfeiture. The adequacy of
procedure under the 1984 Act is especially suspect when the
government seeks forfeiture of attorneys' fees. In attempting
to forfeit the assets used by a defendant to pay attorneys'
fees, the government endeavors to curb the practice of pay-
ing lawyers with the fruits of crime and of disguising the as-
sets of criminal organizations as attorneys' fees paid for ser-
vices rendered. The government pursues this laudable
objective, however, at the expense of jeopardizing a defend-
ant's right to meaningful representation in a criminal pro-
ceeding. In short, a prosecutor may limit significantly the
pool of counsel available to the defendant and constrain the
attorney's ability to act on the defendant's behalf merely by
indicating an intent to seek forfeiture of any fees paid, even
though the prosecutor may have no grounds to suggest that
fees will be subject to forfeiture. Because of the potential ad-
verse effect on the defendant's ability to retain adequate rep-
resentation, this article argues that the 1984 Act as applied to
attorneys' fees is unconstitutional, and recommends an addi-
tional hearing to remedy the problem. In recommending an
amendment to the Act, this article relies primarily on an ar-
gument grounded in terms of the right to a fair trial flowing
from the sixth amendment and from fifth amendment due
process, rather than on an argument based solely in terms of
property rights.'
In taking this position, this article is intentionally limited
in focus, and therefore, examines only a few provisions of the
4. A focus on property rights, in light of the historical underpinnings
of forfeiture, would yield to a due process balancing, inevitably resulting in
fewer protections to the defendant in the face of government forfeiture
efforts. Note the following common law view of forfeiture:
The true reason and only substantial ground of any forfeiture
for crimes consist in this: that all property is derived from society,
being one of those civil rights which are conferred upon individu-
als, in exchange for that degree of natural freedom which every
man must sacrifice when he enters into social communities. If
therefore a member of any national community violates the funda-
mental contract of his association, by transgressing the municipal
law, he forfeits his right to such privileges as he claims by that
contract; and the state may very justly resume that portion of
property, or any part of it, which the laws have before assigned
him.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *299.
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1984 Act. Without denying that criminal racketeering and
drug organizations wield vast economic and social power,"
this article neither claims forfeiture is a necessary means for
stifling the power of criminal organizations, nor contests the
prevailing U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding
criminal forfeiture.6 This article, nevertheless, assumes that
whatever truth dwells in the argument that "institutional in-
terests" are served by ensuring criminal defense work re-
mains a profitable enterprise,' the "institutional" argument
does not justify acceptance of the practice of improving the
quality of the defense bar through fees paid and knowingly
received from the proceeds of crime.
Section I of this article briefly introduces the debate con-
5. The core of organized crime activity is the supplying of illegal
goods and services-gambling, loansharking, narcotics and other
forms of vice-to countless numbers of citizen customers. But or-
ganized crime is also extensively and deeply involved in legitimate
business and in labor unions. Here it employs illegitimate meth-
ods-monopolization, terrorism, extortion, tax evasion-to drive
out or control lawful ownership and leadership and to exact illegal
profits from the public. And to carry on its many activities secure
from governmental interference, organized crime corrupts public
officials.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 187 (1967).
On the infiltration of labor unions, see G. BLAKEY, R. GOLDSTOCK & G.
BRADLEY, LABOR RACKETEERING: BACKGROUND MATERIALS (1979).
Forfeiture, however, is not limited to the activities of organized crime.
"White collar" crimes bilk society out of about $50 billion per year. See
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: EVERYONE'S PROBLEM,
EVERYONE'S Loss 6 (1974).
6. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (forfeiture of the
proceeds of criminal activity).
7. See, e.g., A. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE (1982):
The zealous defense attorney is the last bastion of liberty-the fi-
nal barrier between an overreaching government and its citizens.
The job of the defense attorney is to challenge the government; to
make those in power justify their conduct in relation to the power-
less; to articulate and defend the right of those who lack the abil-
ity or resources to defend themselves.
Id. at 415. See also P. WICE, CRIMINAL LAWYERS, AN ENDANGERED SPECIES,
(1978) (defense of criminals is not so "profitable"); Margolin, Forfeiture of
Attorney Fees and the Future of the Criminal Defense Bar, CHAMPION, June
1985, at 10 (claiming forfeiture of attorneys' fees is part of an attempt to
nationalize the retained bar, effectively eliminating all the best attorneys
from the field); Reed, Criminal Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act of 1984: Raising the Stakes, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 747 (1984) (suggesting
the judicial system has an "institutional incentive" in preventing the reduc-
tion of the quality and availability of criminal defense counsel).
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cerning government efforts to forfeit attorneys' fees under
the 1984 Act; Section II presents an historical context for
RICO and CCE criminal forfeitures and identifies a few of
the peculiarities of forfeiture; Section III addresses the mod-
ern revival of criminal forfeiture, including several provisions
of the 1984 Act; Section IV argues that attorneys' fees are
not excepted from forfeiture under the 1984 Act; Section V
considers the counter-argument based on right to counsel of
choice; Section VI offers a constitutional objection to forfei-
ture of attorneys' fees based on the defendant's right to a fair
trial; and Section VII recommends that Congress amend the
1984 Act to provide for a pre-trial hearing which will facili-
tate a fair trial despite government efforts to forfeit attor-
neys' fees.
I. THE DISPUTE OVER ATTORNEYS' FEES
Under the 1984 Act, the government may indicate its in-
tention to forfeit attorneys' fees directly, by including in an
indictment a request for forfeiture of all the defendant's as-
sets, or more circuitously, by moving for a pre-trial re-
straining order covering the defendant's assets including
those set aside to pay fees. While the restraining order pre-
vents transfer or dispersion of the assets, the government
subsequently might include a forfeiture of fees provision in
the indictment after acquiring further information, such as
attorney-client fee information compelled by a grand jury
subpoena. Interpreted literally, the statute appears to allow
the government to pursue either course of action; nothing on
the face of the 1984 Act excepts attorneys' fees from the
long arm of criminal forfeiture. 8
The extensive reach of the new forfeiture law has stirred
scholars and practitioners enough to inspire some to object to
the law as unconstitutional and "draconian."" This dissent es-
8. The term "fees" does not appear in the statute. Of the scant legis-
lative history existing, nothing speaks to the issue of fees, although prior to
the 1970 Act, Congress did authorize an attack on the economic power of
criminal organizations "on all available fronts," S. REP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969). An earlier draft of a similar forfeiture statute,
stating that "[n]othing in this section is intended to interfere with a per-
son's Sixth Amendment right to counsel," by itself would not appear to
resolve the issue of attorneys' fees. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F.
Supp. 1332, 1347 (D. Colo. 1985) (suggesting that the language is
persuasive).
9. Krieger & Van Dusen, The Lawyer, the Client and the New Law, 22
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 737 (1984); Powerful New Law Pulls Rug from Under Drug
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calates when the government attempts to forfeit attorneys'
fees.' 0 The objections listed in a recent ABA Section Report
typify the response of the defense bar to forfeiture of attor-
neys' fees:
1. It denies an accused the right, under the Sixth
Amendment, to retain counsel of his or her choice;
2. It impedes the ability of such retained counsel to
render effective assistance;
3. It impairs the relationship of confidence and confi-
dentiality between an accused and his or her counsel;
4. It allows the government to manipulate the roster of
counsel, or to disqualify counsel by seeking to compel testi-
mony by the lawyer against the client;
5. It discourages or disallows competent attorneys from
agreeing to represent clients in criminal cases which involve
allegations of forfeiture; and
6. It diverts the efforts and energies of attorneys from
the preparation of the defense of an accused by requiring
them to litigate issues related to their attorney-client
relationship."
In sum, two basic objections exist. First, when the gov-
ernment, by indictment, requests forfeiture of fees or, by re-
straining order, freezes assets set aside to pay defense coun-
sel, the government allegedly has restricted constitutional
protections insofar as the defendant might not be able to re-
tain counsel of choice or counsel of a certain caliber. Second,
in order to obtain fees for services rendered, the attorney
must assert a claim in a post-trial, third-party hearing11a
setting which may require disclosure of confidential attorney-
client communications.
This attack on the statute clothes objections to the forfei-
Dealer's Feet, Chicago Tribune, July 28, 1985, § 2, at 1, col. 1.
10. Buffone, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees and the Effect of the Crime Con-
trol Act of 1984, DRUG L. REP., Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 145; Margolin, supra note
7, at 11; Reed, supra note 7 (suggesting courts should not allow forfeiture
of fees without further direction from Congress); Attorneys Protest Scrutiny
of Fees' Sources, Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 1985, at 6, col. 1 (quoting one attor-
ney's characterization of the government effort as "a diabolical trick").
11. American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Report to the
House of Delegates, Recommendation on Forfeiture (approved as ABA
policy, July 1985) [hereinafter cited as ABA Recommendation on
Forfeiture].
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) (requiring the third
party to show a superior title or lack of knowledge of the illegal source of
the fee).
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ture of attorneys' fees in constitutional language. It is argued
that the statute is unconstitutional as applied because it fails
to afford defendants in a criminal case the the right to coun-
sel guaranteed by the Constitution. Arguments grounded in
terms of the Constitution are generally persuasive. Too
often, however, prevailing constitutional standards are vague
and offer little or no guidance for judges and attorneys chart-
ing unexplored waters. 18 A major goal of this article, there-
fore, is to identify which objections to the forfeiture of attor-
neys' fees have a constitutional foundation.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FORFEITURE
The sanction of forfeiture existed in Biblical,"' Greek,' 5
and Roman" traditions and is deeply rooted in the common
law.1" Governments have used criminal, or in personam,"8 for-
feiture as a penalty in the form of punishment against the
person and only as a consequence of a judgment of convic-
tion, and civil, or in rem,19 forfeiture as a penalty against
13. The difficulty is particularly apparent given the recent under-
standing of the "corrupt lawyer" in criminal organizations. STAFF REPORT
OF PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, MATERIALS ON ETHICAL
ISSuES FOR LAWYERS INVOLVED WITH ORGANIZED CRIME CASES (1985) (the
relatively few attorneys who work for the "mob" constitute a significant
threat to self-governing status of the bar).
14. Exodus 21:28 ("If an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die,
then the ox shall be stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten").
15. See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 8 (1881).
16. 7 TWELVE TABLES 1, translated in 1 S.P. SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW 69
(1932).
17. See generally Reed & Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Forfeitable "Interests"
and Procedural Due Process, 62 N.C.L. REV. 57 (1983); Note, Bane of Ameri-
can Forfeiture Law- Banished at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768 (1977).
18. An in personam action is one which seeks judgment against a per-
son as distinguished from a judgment against property. The government's
right to property in an in personam forfeiture attaches only "by the convic-
tion of the offender." The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827). See,
e.g., Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalities and Forfeitures: A Framework for Con-
stitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 476 (1976); Note, A Proposal to
Reform Criminal Forfeiture Under RICO and CCE, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1929,
1931 (1984).
19. An in rem action is one which is taken directly against property,
taking no cognizance of the owner but determining rights in specific prop-
erty against all the world, equally binding on everyone. Admiralty law, for
example, is a bountiful source of history on the in rem suit. An in rem pro-
ceeding against a vessel was the typical means for enforcement of the mari-
time lien. See G. GILMORE & G. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 36-7 (2d ed.
1975).
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property regardless of the property owner's culpability. 0 Al-
though the history of in personam and in rem forfeitures is
extensively documented, 1 it is helpful to examine briefly the
historical development of these two types of forfeiture in or-
der to provide a context for making judgments about the va-
lidity of RICO and CCE forfeiture procedures.
A. In rem Forfeiture
The origins of in rem forfeiture are diverse. Deodand,
England's Navigation Acts, and nineteenth-century jurispru-
dence of the United States Supreme Court form the founda-
tion of present in rem forfeiture procedure.
According to the common law doctrine of deodand,22
the Crown confiscated the instrument of a man's death s It
was believed that before a dead man could "rest in peace,"
the instrument of death-the "bane"-had to be presented
to the sovereign to replace the slayer's kin as the object of
vengeance.24 The Church used part of the proceeds from sale
of the instrument of death to fund Masses for the deceased,2 5
and the Crown benefited from a steady source of revenue.2
20. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
680-81 (1974). The effectiveness and advisability of civil forfeiture for
states is still very much in debate. See, e.g., Best & Fishman, Forfeiture: An
Effective Drug Law Tool?, 64 MICH. BAR J. 1020 (1985) (debating the merits
of Michigan's controlled substance civil forfeiture statute); Zelman &
Zelman, The Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, 57 FLA. BAR J. 550 (1983)
(identifying the broad range of private property which may be considered
contraband). See also State v. 1979 Pontiac Trans Am, 98 N.J. 474, 487
A.2d 722 (1985) (law disfavors forfeitures and should be construed to pro-
tect owners who have done all that reasonably could be expected to pre-
vent illegal use of their property).
21. See Calero-Toledo, 418 U.S. at 680-81; Note, Criminal Forfeiture:
Attacking the Economic Dimension of Organized Narcotics Trafficking, 32 AM.
U.L. REV. 227, 232 (1982); Note, supra note 17; Note, California Forfeiture
Statute: A Means for Curbing Drug-Trafficking?, 15 PAC. L. J. 1035 (1984);
Note, Criminal Forfeiture and the Necessity for a Post-Seizure Hearing: Are CCE
and RICO Rackets for the Government?, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 776, 780 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Post-Seizure Hearing].
22. Deodand is the Latin Deo dandum-"given to God." The institu-
tion probably resulted from the merger of biblical and pagan traditions. See
Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeit-
ures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMPLE L.Q.
169, 181 (1973).
23. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 15, at 24-25.
24. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 473
(2d ed. 1898).
25. Finkelstein, supra note 22, at 182.
26. Reed & Gill, supra note 17, at 64 n.56; See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S.
19861
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Although earlier approval of the deodand practice appears to
have resulted from a common "hatred for anything giving us
pain, ' 2 7 rather than from a more logical rationale, deodand
survived the first half of the nineteenth-century in Britain as
a penalty to be applied when death resulted from negli-
gence.21 American common law, on the other hand, never
adopted the practice, 29 although the Supreme Court has
stated that at least an analogy to the law of deodand is appro-
priate for federal forfeiture laws.3 0
American in rem forfeiture law also developed in part
from England's Navigation Acts of the seventeenth century, 1
which required the shipping of commodities in English ves-
s'els. Violation of the statutory scheme resulted in forfeiture
of the "smuggled goods" and of the vessel itself, without re-
gard for the culpability of the owner.32 The Crown prose-
cuted these cases in vice-admiralty courts, without the obsta-
cle of a colonial jury, and the property owner or other
claimants bore the burden of showing statutory compliance. 33
at 681.
27. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 15, at 11.
28. Reed & Gill, supra note 17, at 64 n.60, (citing M. HALE, PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 424 (1st Am. ed. 1847)). Hale argued that the abolition of deo-
dands (An Act to Abolish Deodands, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. ch. 62) followed
naturally once England decided to introduce the first wrongful death stat-
ute (An Act for Compensating the Families of Persons Killed by Accidents,
1846, 9 & 10 Vict. ch. 93).
29. Calero-Toledo, 418 U.S. at 682.
30. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921)
(forfeiture of automobile for illegal transport of liquor, since it is "a 'thing'
that can be used in the removal of 'goods and commodities' and the law is
explicit in its condemnation of such things." Id. at 513). The rationale for
many in rem forfeitures is "none other than the rationale that lay behind
the deodand ...exacted by the sovereign, i.e., the Crown in Britain, on a
comparably strict and absolute basis." Finkelstein, supra note 22, at 222.
31. L. HARPER, THE ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAWS: A SEVENTEENTH-CEN-
TURY EXPERIMENT IN SOCIAL ENGINEERING 111 (1964).
32. Id.
33. Wroth, The Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court and the Federal Ad-
miralty Jurisdiction, 6 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 258 (1962). The Crown preferred
to avoid the colonial jury, a practice ardently criticized by John Adams:
The Parliament in one Clause guarding the People of the Realm,
and securing to them the Benefit of a Tryal by the Law of the
Land, and by the next Clause, depriving all Americans of that
Priviledge. What shall we say to this Distinction? Is there not in
this Clause, a Brand of Infamy, of Degradation, and Disgrace,
fixed upon every American? Is he not degraded below the Rank of
an Englishman?
2 J. ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS 200 (1965).
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Borrowing the model of the Navigation Acts, the first
Congress authorized statutory in rem forfeiture of ships in vi-
olation of customs laws.14 In two nineteenth-century cases,
Justice Story greatly influenced the development of in rem
forfeiture law in the United States, fostering in the process
the "personification fiction." In The Palmyra, 5 Story held
that federal statutory law permitted a federal court sitting in
admiralty to impose a forfeiture in rem without a prior crimi-
nal conviction. In a later, similar case,36 a shipowner demon-
strated that his master acted without authority, and there-
fore, since he, as owner, was not guilty of "piratical
aggressions" he should not suffer the consequences of forfei-
ture. Denying the argument, Story elaborated on his "per-
sonification" rationale for imposing forfeiture: "The vessel
which commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as
the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture at-
taches, without any reference whatsoever to the character or
conduct of the owner.13 7 Story claimed that this result was
not uncommon to the law,38 but in fact was necessary as a
means for "suppressing the offense or wrong, or insuring an
indemnity to the injured party."3 9 In upholding the forfei-
ture, Story had established the role of the personification fic-
tion in dismissing the requirement of owner's culpability for
in rem forfeitures in the United States. Thus, in rem forfei-
ture could be used to attack "guilty property," not merely
"guilty persons."
Although in 1871 the Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of using in rem forfeitures to impose the purely
punitive sanction of confiscating Confederate-owned prop-
erty,10 some courts, nevertheless, distinguished between mere
34. Act of July 31, 1789, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 47.
35. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827). The case bears the name of the
ship seized by a United States vessel for "piratical aggression."
36. United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
37. Id. at 233.
38. Story noted that in rem forfeiture was common to smuggling and
other misconduct prohibited by the revenue laws. Id.
39. Id. He may have been more concerned about preserving customs
revenues which at the time provided three-fourths of all federal revenues.
Reed & Gill, supra note 17, at 66. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 33,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 712 (1960).
40. The Court upheld the law, not on due process grounds, but as an
exercise of the war power in taking enemy property. Tyler v. Defrees, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 331 (1871); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268
(1871); McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259 (1871).
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remedial forfeitures and punitive forfeitures requiring proof
of personal guilt. In Boyd v. United States, 41 the Supreme
Court explained that "proceedings instituted for the purpose
of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of
offenses committed by him, though they may be civil in form,
are in their nature criminal, '42 and therefore entitle the de-
fendant to constitutional protections normally afforded a
criminal defendant.4 8 The punitive-remedial distinction of
Boyd admonishes that in rem procedural rules may not be con-
stitutionally sufficient for forfeitures requiring proof of per-
sonal guilt.
44
As with their historical antecedents, modern in rem suits
determine rights in specific property against all the world and
without regard to the culpability of the property owner. The
The Civil War presented the dilemma of how to punish rebels in absentia
for treason. The existing treason statutes, requiring personal jurisdiction of
the defendant, proved to be an inadequate route for confiscating Confed-
erate-owned property in the North. With the Confiscation Acts, Act of July
17, 1862, ch. 195, § 5, 12 Stat. 589 (1862), Congress approved just nar-
rowly, and over President Lincoln's objection, the use of in rem forfeitures
for punitive purposes. After the Supreme Court of Kentucky held the Act
unconstitutional in Norris v. Doniphan, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 385 (1863), the
U.S. Supreme Court was obliged to examine and uphold the constitutional-
ity of the Act, despite a vigorous dissent arguing that the forfeiture pun-
ished offenders for treason, and therefore, could be imposed only pursuant
to a criminal proceeding. Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 355-56.
41. 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (holding unconstitutional an act authorizing
seizure of private papers to be used as evidence in prosecution of alleged
crime).
42. Id. at 634.
43. E.g., Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886) (prior acquittal
on tax fraud bars subsequent forfeiture action for the same conduct). But
see United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 104 S. Ct. 1099
(1984) (disagreeing in the case of civil, remedial forfeiture not intended as
punishment or a criminal penalty).
44. This is the position taken in Reed & Gill, supra note 17, at 67-68.
Although civil sanctions can be even more punishing than criminal penal-
ties, and arguably, therefore should not be imposed without criminal safe-
guards such as counsel, the courts have refused to equate "severe" and
"criminal." One factor supporting this reluctance is that it would be ex-
tremely burdensome for a court to determine which civil actions were se-
vere enough to merit criminal safeguards. On the other hand, some civil
sanctions are indeed punitive and have a strong deterrent element. Appar-
ently, however, a civil penalty will differ from a criminal fine because of the
large element of retribution and moral condemnation that accompanies the
criminal penalty. See Clark, supra note 18, at 407. The Supreme Court re-
cently has examined the subtle distinctions. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,
104 S. Ct. at 1102-07 (civil forfeiture of unlicensed firearms has broad re-
medial aims).
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government may seize the property if it has probable cause to
believe the property was used to commit the alleged of-
fense.' Because of the lower burden of proof and less intri-
cate procedure, law enforcement officials use the numerous
civil forfeiture measures more often than the RICO and CCE
criminal provisions. 46 In such a civil proceeding, the claimant
bears the burden of showing lack of probable cause for the
forfeiture. 7 Although the claim of lack of knowledge of the
illegal activity may preserve rights in the property seized,'8
the court may require the owner of property to take all rea-
sonable precautions to prevent the illegal use of property."
Typically, an in rem forfeiture "relates back" to the commis-
sion of the offense, 0 meaning subsequent transfers of the
"guilty" property are voided.
B. In Personam Forfeiture
In personam forfeiture requires a prior determination of
guilt. The common law sanction of attainder inflicted the
complete forfeiture of all real and personal property on
felons and traitors. 51 The forfeiture followed swiftly upon the
45. E.g., United States v. One 56-foot Yacht Named Tahuna, 702
F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1983) (question is whether "information relied on by
the government is adequate and sufficiently reliable to warrant the belief
by a reasonable person that the vessel was used to transport controlled sub-
stances." Id. at 1282). Pre-hearing seizure is constitutional in only "ex-
traordinary situations." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, reh'g denied, 409
U.S. 902 (1972) (e.g., when (1) seizure is necessary to secure general public
interest, (2) special need for very prompt action, and (3) state insures that a
government official initiates the seizure. 407 U.S. at 90-91).
46. Congress has authorized civil in rem forfeiture of controlled sub-
stances and the articles used to transport controlled substances, 21 U.S.C.
§ 881; obscene materials, 18 U.S.C. § 1465; money used in bribery
schemes, 18 U.S.C. § 3612; articles not registered for customs, 19 U.S.C. §
1497; unlicensed firearms 18 U.S.C. § 924(d); and adulterated foods and
drugs, 21 U.S.C. § 334.
47. United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 529 F.2d 65 (9th Cir.
1976).
48. United States. v. M/V Andoria, 768 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1985)
(rights of holder of maritime lien are protected so long as had no knowl-
edge of owner's illegal venture).
49. United States v. One Boeing 707 Aircraft, 750 F.2d 1280 (5th
Cir.) cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2117 (1985) (limited efforts on part of owner
not enough to prevent forfeiture of "gun running" aircraft).
50. See infra note 76. Not only must subsequent transferees be con-
cerned with civil forfeiture, but so too must secured parties. Goldsmith-
Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 513 (referring to "guilt" of the property).
51. In the view of Blackstone, threat of forfeiture deterred criminal
activity:
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heels of a conviction for a felony and the customary felony
sentence of death.5 2
The American colonies adopted English forfeiture laws
only sporadically. 8 Because of the severity of punishment
which denied heirs their inheritance, in 1787 the new coun-
try abolished forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood for
the offense of treason," and three years later, prohibited for-
feiture of estate for all convictions and judgments.55 Not until
1970, in RICO and CCE, did in personam forfeiture reappear
in the law of the United States.
III. REVIVAL OF CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
In 1970 Congress revived criminal forfeiture by intro-
[H]e who has thus violated the fundamental principles of govern-
ment, and broke his part of the original contract between king
and people, has abandoned his connexions with society; and has
no longer any right to those advantages, which before belonged to
him purely as a member of the community; among which social
advantages, the right of transfering or transmitting property to
others is of chief. Such forfeitures, moreover, whereby his poster-
ity must suffer as well as himself, will help to restrain a man, not
only by the sense of his duty, and dread of personal punishment,
but also by his passions and natural affections.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *382.
52. Id. at *387. See also Blakey, Asset Forfeiture under the Federal Crim-
inal Law, in THE POLITICS AND ECoNoMIS OF ORGANIZED CRIME (1985). Also
note that the more serious the crime, the more severe the loss. Upon con-
viction for treason, the king forfeited personal and real property, and cor-
ruption of blood. Hence, no line of inheritance could be traced through
the attainted ancestor. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *381. See also 1 J.
BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW 583 (9th ed. 1923).
53. In colonial New York, for example, the seizure of goods in felony
cases was rare. Not only were most convicted felons so "meanly circum-
stanced" that they lacked anything to forfeit, but with the problem of un-
derpopulation, it made no sense to authorize a sanction against heirs if the
sanction would provide the impetus for sons of settlers to seek freeholds in
other colonies. J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL
NEW YORK 715-17 (1944). On the other hand, upon conviction for treason
or felony in colonial Virginia, all the offender's goods and chattels were
forfeited, and the felon's heirs could not inherit any property. A. Scor,
CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 109 (1930).
54. "The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of
Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or
Foreiture except during the Life of the Person attainted." U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 3, cl. 2.
55. "Provided always, and be it enacted, that no conviction or judg-
ment for any of the offences aforesaid, shall work corruption of blood, or
any forfeiture of estate." I Stat. 117, ch. 9, § 24 (1790), codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3563 (1982).
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ducing forfeiture provisions in the RICO and CCE statutes.
Because criminal forfeiture was limited to property con-
nected to illegal activity and did not reach other property of
the offender, Congress avoided a conflict with the 1790 stat-
ute prohibiting forfeiture of estate." With this distinction
made, however, it is questionable to what extent pre-Revolu-
tionary in personam forfeiture serves as the predecessor to
RICO and CCE forfeitures."
RICO authorized the forfeiture of any "interest"58 ac-
quired or maintained in violation of the substantive provi-
sions of RICO, and of any interest used to influence an enter-
prise operated in violation of these provisions.5 9 Likewise,
56. For a survey of the 1970 Act, see Taylor, Forfeiture under 18
U.S.C. § 1963 - RICO's Most Powerful Weapon, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 379
(1980).
57. Consider, for example, that RICO and CCE criminal forfeiture,
an in personam procedure, utilizes distinctively in rem concepts like "rela-
tion back." Based on the principle that the government's interest in for-
feited property "relates back" to the time the offense was committed, the
government takes priority over all other interests attaching to the property
subsequent to commission of the offense. See infra note 76.
58. Judicial interpretation of a forfeitable "interest" underscores the
powerful impact forfeiture can have in penetrating illicit drug and racke-
teering activities. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
Moreover, upon conviction, forfeiture of the defendant's "interests" is
mandatory. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 833 (1980) (compelling forfeiture of stock in a company through
which the defendant acquired sewer contracts on the strength of a scheme
of kickbacks). It may be an "illegal sentence" when the district court fails
to order complete forfeiture of illegally acquired property, as determined
by the jury. United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 959 (1983) (court could not exclude two parcels of property
from the forfeiture for support of the defendant's wife and newborn child);
United States v. Murillo, 709 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1983) (court could not
exclude one of the defendant's houses and one of his cars). Therefore, the
court must order forfeiture of the defendant's illegitimate interest in a bus-
iness even though it would affect property rights of others in the company.
United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1005 (1984).
59. In its pre-1984 form, the relevant RICO forfeiture provision is
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982):
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chap-
ter shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more
than twenty years, or both, and shall forfeit to the United States
(1) any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation Of sec-
tion 1962, and (2) any interest in, security of, claim against, or
property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of
influence over, any enterprise which he has established, operated,
controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in viola-
tion of section 1962.
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CCE authorized the forfeiture of profit obtained from oper-
ating a drug enterprise, and of any interest used to influence
a drug enterprise.60 Under these statutes (as under the 1984
Act), the government can achieve forfeiture only after the is-
suance of a grand jury indictment specifying the items to be
forfeited,61 the finding of forfeiture by a jury,6" and the entry
of a judgment of forfeiture by the court.6 Of course, because
the proceeding is criminal, the court cannot enter a forfei-
ture judgment without a prior in personam judgment of
guilt.64
Congress intended criminal forfeiture to be used as a law
enforcement instrument for taking the profit out of organ-
ized criminal activity as well as for severing the connection
between the principal criminal suspects and their property
The court may accept satisfactory performance bonds in connection with
property subject to forfeiture. Id. § 1963(b). Upon conviction, the Attor-
ney General seizes property ordered forfeited. Id. § 1963(c).
60. In their pre-1984 form the relevant CCE forfeiture provisions
are codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1982):
§848. Continuing criminal enterprise
(a) Penalties; forfeitures
(1) Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be
less than 10 years and which may be up to life imprisonment, to a
fine of not more than $100,000, and to the forfeiture prescribed
in paragraph (2); except that if any person engages in such activity
after one or more prior convictions of him under this section have
become final, he shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
which may not be less than 20 years and which may be up to life
imprisonment, to a fine of not more than $200,000, and to the
forfeiture prescribed in paragraph (2).
(2) Any person who is convicted under paragraph (1) of engag-
ing in a continuing criminal enterprise shall forfeit to the United
States-
(A) the profits obtained by him in such enterprise, and
(B) any of his interest in, claim against, or property or contrac-
tual rights of any kind affording a source of influence over, such
enterprise.
61. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2).
62. FED. R. GRIM. P. 3 1(e).
63. FED. R. GRIM. P. 32(b)(2).
64. An in personam judgment binds only the party to the litigation.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969)
("It is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam result-
ing from litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he
has not been made a party by service of process."), rev'd on other grounds,
401 U.S. 321 (1971). See also United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919 (3d Cir.
1982) (forfeiture vacated along with reversed RICO conviction).
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sources of economic power. 65 In this regard, courts have up-
held the forfeiture of a restaurant used as a site for gambling
activities," stock and a position in the corporation through
which the defendant bribed officials, 7 union offices," and
homes, whether purchased with proceeds of the continuing
criminal enterprise" or used as stash houses for a marijuana
distribution network.7 0
Yet, government achieved very little with usage of crimi-
nal forfeiture. Although Congress. authorized use of the for-
feiture mechanism as a powerful crime-fighting tool, a mea-
sure of its "success" in the fifteen years since 1970 is evident
in the words of the Comptroller General:
[L]ittle has been done. Forfeitures to date have consisted
primarily of the vehicles used to smuggle drugs and cash
used in drug transactions. Compared to the profits realized,
these forfeitures have amounted to little more than inciden-
tal operating expenses. The illicit profits themselves and the
assets acquired with them have remained virtually
untouched.71
Despite the obvious difficulties in securing forfeiture of
assets,72 Congress molded a number of bills, revisions, and fi-
65. What is needed here, the committee believes, are new ap-
proaches that will deal not only with individuals, but also with the
economic base through which these individuals constitute such a
serious threat to the well-being of the nation. In short, an attack
must be made on their source of economic power itself, and the
attack must take place on all available fronts.
S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969).
66. United States v. Smaldone, 583 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
67. United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 1752 (1985).
68. United States v. Rubin, 591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 864 (1979).
69. United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1980).
70. Unites States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447 (1 1th Cir. 1984). See also
United States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566 (11 th Cir. 1985) (no requirement to
trace proceeds of kickback scheme on real estate transactions).
71. COMpTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ASSET FORFErruRE
- A SELVoM USED TOOL IN COMBATTING DRUG TRAFFICKING 9 (1981) (recom-
mending Congress "strengthen" forfeiture statutes). Of the ninety-eight
RICO and CCE narcotics cases through March 1980, the government for-
feited $2 million, which is less revenue than one heroin trafficker can gen-
erate in a month. Id. at 10.
72. See, e.g., Forfeiture in Drug Cases: Hearings on H.R. 2648, H.A.
2910, H.R. 4110, H.R. 5371 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm.
of the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., 223-24 (1983) (testimony of
19861
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
nal adjustments to strengthen the law of criminal forfeiture
in the form of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984.
A. Congressional Intent of the 1984 Act
In passing the new law, Congress acknowledged:
conviction of individual racketeers and drug dealers would
be of only limited effectiveness if the economic power bases
of criminal organizations were left intact ... traditional
criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate
to deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in dan-
gerous drugs which, with its inevitable attendant violence, is
plaguing the country. 8
Congress decided that any success in combating racketeers
and drug traffickers will depend on how well government car-
ries out an assault on the economic benefits7 reaped by these
criminals, and specifically on how well government can utilize
forfeiture. Such an assault required procedural clarity, ac-
cording to Congress. Thus, the purpose of the Forfeiture Act
is "to eliminate the statutory limitations and ambiguities that
have frustrated active pursuit of forfeiture by Federal law en-
Irvin B. Nathan, Deputy Attorney General):
Discovering a defendant's assets, securing them, providing their
relationship to his crimes and seizing them after judgment are ex-
tremely difficult, time-consuming tasks which most federal investi-
gations and prosecutors are not particularly well equipped to han-
dle. Sophisticated criminals, with access to top flight lawyers and
accountants, can readily conceal their assets. The assets can be
kept in the names of nominees, in secret bank accounts overseas,
in shell corporations or run through money laundering opera-
tions. Even when assets are uncovered, and title is proven, there
are evidentiary problems in attempting to link the assets to crimi-
nal activities. Finally, prosecutors are concerned that introducing
detailed evidence relating to forfeitable assets may prolong and
make more complex the criminal trial.
73. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3182, 3374 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
74. The Internal Revenue Service made conservative estimates of un-
reported 1981 income: $23.4 billion in drugs; $3.4 billion in gambling;
$7.4 billion in prostitution. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: ESTIMATES FOR 1973-81, at 35-
39 (1983). Other sources claim illicit income is much higher. NATIONAL IN-
TELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMM., THE SUPPLY OF DRUGS TO THE U.S. ILLICIT
MARKET FROM FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC SOURCES IN 1979, at 5 (1979) (estimat-
ing $64 billion in illicit drug income in 1979). Theft and fencing is lucra-
tive also. See, e.g., Blakey & Goldsmith, Criminal Redistribution of Stolen Prop-
erty: The Need for Law Reform, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1511 (1977).
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forcement agencies. . . [which is accomplished by] focus[ing]




The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 attempts to
clarify the role of criminal forfeiture in law enforcement's ef-
forts against crime-for-profit organizations. Apart from the
many changes made, Congress retained much of the familiar
in personam procedure of the 1970 Act, which authorized for-
feiture only upon a conviction and a finding of forfeiture by a
jury. In the 1984 Act, some provisions formalize standards of
procedure 7 6 others attempt to resolve conflicts between fed-
eral courts 7 7 and still others attempt to provide procedural
guidance for carrying out forfeiture objectives 8.7  Through
75. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 192.
76. Congress formalizes the theory, for example, that forfeiture "re-
lates back" to the time of the act giving rise to the forfeiture, 18 U.S.C. §
1963(c); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (effectively reversing United States v. McMani-
gal, 723 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1983), which held that the "relation back" doc-
trine does not apply to RICO), a theory which Congress claims has a long
history of acceptance in civil forfeiture law. See United States v. Stowell,
133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890) (right to the property conditionally vests in the
government immediately upon commission of the offense). Because the
government interest is not "perfected" until the judge and jury have de-
clared forfeiture is proper, forfeiture operates much like an equitable lien.
See Trojanowski, RICO Forfeiture: Tracing and Procedure, in 1 MATERIALS ON
RICO 353 (G. Blakey ed. 1980). Essentially; the provision operates to void
all pre-conviction transfers, with the exception of "arms length" transac-
tions with purchasers having no notice of prior interests.
77. The proceeds, or property derived from proceeds, obtained in
violation of RICO shall be forfeited. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (codifying the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Russello). Compare United States v. Maru-
beni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980), with United States v.
Martino, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1981), affid, Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16 (1983). Congress had already authorized the forfeiture of "profits"
under CCE. See supra, note 60.
78. The original forfeiture bill considered by Congress included a
substitute assets provision, authorizing the court to order forfeiture of sub-
stitute assets of equivalent value in the event property deemed subject to
forfeiture is no longer available at the time of conviction. Encouraged by
the ABA Criminal Justice Section, Congress deleted the substitute assets
section and opted instead for an alternative fine provision: "In lieu of a
fine otherwise authorized by this section, a defendant who derives profits
or other proceeds from an offense may be fined not more than twice the
gross profits of other proceeds." 18 U.S.C. §1963(a); 21 U.S.C. §855. See
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on
H.R. 3272, H.R. 3299, and H.R. 3275; 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1983) (re-
marks of Stephen Horn, and William W. Taylor, on behalf of the ABA
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these provisions, Congress successfully infused into the new
law many of the procedural protections typically associated
with criminal proceedings, but notably missing from the 1970
version of criminal forfeiture. 7 9
An example of the protections is the post-trial hearing
for consideration of third-party claims."0 Since third parties
may not intervene or commence a suit to interfere with the
principal case, bonafide purchasers of the property must avail
themselves of the post-trial hearing. Thus, should the prose-
cutor decide to seek forfeiture of attorneys' fees, the attorney
may be forced to assert the claim for fees in this hearing. To
prevail in the hearing, the petitioner must establish, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that (1) the petitioner had a le-
gal interest in the property superior to the interest of the de-
fendant at the time of the acts giving rise to the forfeiture, or
(2) the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value without
cause to believe the property was subject to forfeiture.81
Criminal Justice Section). Since the "may be fined" language vests discre-
tion in the court, presumably, the trial judge will mete out a fine based on
the defendant's ability to pay. See Note, supra note 18 (recommending a
"profits fine" in proportion to the offender's unjust enrichment from the
crime).
The congressional approach to RICO and CCE forfeiture was almost
identical. The CCE forfeiture provisions differ from RICO, however, in
one important way: a rebuttable presumption operates at trial that a per-
son's property is subject to forfeiture if the United States establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acquired the property
at, or reasonably after, the time of the violation, and that there was no
likely source for such property other than through violating the statute. 21
U.S.C. §853(e).
79. See, e.g., Reed & Gill, supra note 17; Note, Due Process in Prelimi-
nary Proceeding Under RICO and CCE, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 2068 (1983); Note,
Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute: Effect of Forfeiture Provisions on Third
Parties, 22 DUQUESNE L. REV. 171 (1983); Note, Post-Seizure Hearing, supra
note 21.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n). Prior to this stage, a
special jury verdict is required for property vis-a-vis the defendant. "If the
indictment or the information alleges that an interest or property is subject
to criminal forfeiture, a special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of
the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any." FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 (e).
In fulfilling the requirement the jury may have to specify which proper-
ties were part of the criminal enterprise and the percentage of the defend-
ant's interest in each. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980). The special verdict requirement may be
waived, however, if the parties have entered into a stipulation "in lieu of a
Special Verdict," setting forth the defendant's ownership interest subject
to forfeiture and preserving the right to challenge any forfeiture. United
States v. Hess, 691 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1982).
81. If the petitioner "prevails," the court will amend the order of
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Thus, assuming the defendant paid the attorney after com-
mitting the alleged offense, the attorney petitioning for fees
would have to present the facts relied upon in believing the
defendant's assets were not subject to forfeiture.
While Congress authorized the expanded use of pre-trial
injunctions and restraining orders, which operate to freeze
assets and "to prevent dissipation pending determination of
guilt or innocence," 8 the Forfeiture Act ensures that these
orders can issue only according to procedures which mini-
mize the adverse impact on affected property.83 After notice
and an opportunity for a hearing is given to the property
owner, a trial court may issue a pre-indictment restraining or-
der if (1) "there is a substantial probability that the United
States will prevail on the issue of forfeiture," (2) failure to
enter the order will result in making the property unavailable
for forfeiture, and (3) the court determines that "the need to
preserve the availability of the property through the entry of
the requested order outweighs the hardship on any party
against whom the order is to be entered."" Conceivably,
such an order may encompass the assets used to pay attor-
neys' fees. Furthermore, under extraordinary circumstances,
the government may seek a temporary, pre-indictment re-
forfeiture accordingly. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6)(A)-(B); 21 U.S.C. §
853(n)(6). If the petitioner fails to present the required proof, the United
States holds clear title to the property. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(7); 21 U.S.C. §
853(n)(7). The adequacy of protection for third party interests is ques-
tioned in United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1985).
The statute does not require hearing before a jury, which might appear
to be unconstitutional in light of United States v. One 1976 Mercedes
Benz, 618 F.2d 453 (1980) (holding that the owner of a vehicle subject to
civil forfeiture has right of trial by jury). However, the third party hearing
is not a civil forfeiture proceeding, or suit at common law, but rather is
more akin to a hearing on a petition in equity to clear a "clouded" title,
and therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to a jury under the Seventh
Amendment. Schwartz v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 224 (D. Md. 1984)
(government not required to reprove ownership every time a new claim is
asserted). On the other hand, the denial of a jury has precedent in in rem
forfeiture under the Navigation Acts. See supra note 33 and accompanying
text.
82. United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(1)(B)(i)-(ii); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
Considerable lower-court litigation preceded adoption of a standard of
proof for sustaining a restraining order. E.g., United States v. Veliotis, 586
F. Supp. 1512 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("probable cause"); United States v. Beck-
ham, 562 F.Supp. 488 (E.D. Mich. 1983) ("clear and convincing"); United
States v. Harvey, 560 F.Supp. 1040 (S.D. Fla. 1982) ("preponderance");
United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same).
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straining order without prior notice or opportunity for a
hearing.85 For this ex parte order to issue, the government
must establish probable cause that the property is subject to
forfeiture and that provision of notice would jeopardize the
availability of the property.8
Although the Act provides for a hearing when the gov-
ernment seeks a pre-indictment restraining order (even if ex
parte, a hearing must be held within ten days), it neglects to
require a hearing when the restraining order is requested
"upon the filing of an indictment or information" charging a
violation of RICO or CCE.87 The reason for the omission of
a hearing could be that the probable cause determination
(that a crime is committed and that forfeitable property is
connected with the crime) required for the grand jury to file
an indictment is an adequate substitute for the "substantial
probability" standard which prevails at-the hearing on a pre-
trial restraining order. The fact that restraints on liberty re-
quire only a probable cause determination makes this substi-
tution plausible. 88 The same rationale, however, cannot jus-
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(2).
86. The ex parte order may last for no more than ten days unless ex-
tended for good cause. Also, a hearing must be held at the earliest possible
time but prior to expiration of the temporary order. Id.
Although Congress concedes that "[t]he permissibility of the postpone-
ment of notice and hearing until after the initial entry of a restraining or-
der in a criminal forfeiture case has not been squarely addressed by the
Supreme Court," SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 204, the legislators rely
primarily on the civil forfeiture precedent of Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), which upheld the seizure of a
pleasure yacht without prior notice and hearing since (1) the seizure served
the significant governmental purpose of instituting in rem forfeiture; (2) ad-
vance notice might thwart the governmental objective; and (3) the seizure
was conducted by governmental officials who can determine the legality of
the seizure. Id. at 671. In a more recent case, albeit civil, the Supreme
Court has stated that the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act serve as a
proper analogue for determining whether the delay in conducting a post-
seizure hearing has violated the defendant's rights of due process. United
States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(1)(A); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A).
88. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (probable cause deter-
mination is sufficient for extending restraint on liberty after arrest); United
States v. Graewe, 689 F.2d 54, 56-58 (6th Cir. 1982) (pre-trial bail denied
based on hearsay showing of danger to witnesses in RICO prosecution);
United States v. James, 674 F.2d 886, 891-92 (11th Cir. 1982) (pre-trial
bail set at $2 million to assure appearance of defendants). See also SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1983, S. REP. No. 147,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1983) (stating that proof of "substantial
probability" of flight is not required because of the difficulty in meeting
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tify neglecting to require a hearing on the restraining order
upon the filing of an information. The information is typi-
cally filed by the prosecutor alone without the review and
"check" of a judicial officer or grand jury; that is, the prose-
cutor could restrain the defendant's assets without a hearing
on the validity of the restraint. Fair procedure, or due pro-
cess,8 9 may require a "prompt hearing," compelling the gov-
ernment to produce adequate grounds to justify the
restraint. 0
IV. WHY ATTORNEYS' FEES ARE NOT EXCEPTED FROM
FORFEITURE
With the blessing of Congress and the procedural clarity
to pursue the assets of racketeers and drug traffickers
through criminal forfeiture, federal prosecutors are in a posi-
tion to make comprehensive attacks on criminal organiza-
tions. For some prosecutors, this entails scrutiny of lawyer ac-
tivity, including efforts to forfeit attorneys' fees. These
efforts would come as little surprise since the language of the
1984 Act locates the government's interest in forfeited assets
at the time the offense is committed. Given this relation back lan-
guage, the prosecutor may decide to pursue fees believed to
be paid with the proceeds of criminal activity or with the as-
sets of an illegitimate enterprise. Even if it is uncommon for a
recently-indicted person to transfer "tainted" property to an
attorney as a retainer,"1 the relation back concept, it seems,
would vest in the government a priority interest in the illegit-
imate, forfeitable property superior to the interest of the
third-party attorney.
the standard so early in the criminal proceedings).
89. Although "due process has never been, and perhaps can never
be, precisely defined," Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981), the Supreme Court has recognized that hearings to determine the
validity of governmental restraints are fundamental to due process. Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
90. United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1984) (failure to
conduct hearing, however, does not disturb the conviction); United States
v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1982) (prosecution must show the
probability that jury will convict the defendant and find the properties sub-
ject to forfeiture). Recently, in United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376
(9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the failure to
hold a hearing over the course of five years violated the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Rule 65 requirement of an immediate hearing whenever
the court grants a temporary restraining order ex parte.
91. It does occur. See, e.g., United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476
(4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981).
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In United States v. Rogers,"9 however, a Colorado federal
district court granted the defendant's motion to exclude at-
torneys' fees from forfeiture based on the rationale that
"Congress intended different treatment of assets transferred
to third parties and assets in the hands of the defendant." '"
Writing for the court in Rogers, Judge Kane declared that the
1984 Act was not designed to upset "legitimate transfers for
value," and therefore, assets no longer held by a defendant
could be forfeited only if "transferred as some type of sham
or artifice."" In other words, according to Rogers, if the as-
sets transferred to an attorney are given for value-the attor-
neys' services-the exchange is bona fide and the fees are not
to be forfeited.
The reasoning of Rogers is difficult to reconcile with op-
eration of the relation back doctrine. The government's in-
terest in the defendant's illegitimate assets, whether property
used to influence an illegal enterprise or proceeds obtained
from criminal activity, vests at the time the underlying crimi-
nal offense is committed. The government's interest is super-
seded only if a petitioner can fulfill the requirements of the
third-party hearing, namely: (1) show a prior, superior inter-
est in the assets, or (2) show that the assets were acquired in a
bona fide transaction for value and without notice that the
property was "subject to forfeiture." Rogers construes this
language to mean that property transferred for value in a
bona fide transaction is not "subject to forfeiture." On the
contrary, the third-party hearing language does not address
what property is "subject to forfeiture, ' 9 5 nor does it limit in
any way the operation of the relation back doctrine to vest
property in the government immediately upon commission of
the offense. Rather, the third-party hearing language merely
provides a remedy for transferees who can show they have
given value and had no notice of the government's priority
interest in the property "subject to forfeiture."
The 1984 Act, therefore, does not except assets used for
attorneys' fees from items subject to forfeiture under RICO
and CCE. In the cautionary words of a New York district
court in Simels v. United States:
[Flees paid to attorneys cannot become a safe harbor from
92. 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Col. 1985).
93. Id. at 1347.
94. Id.
95. Property subject to forfeiture is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)
and 21 U.S.C. § 853(a).
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forfeiture of the profits of illegal enterprises. In the same
manner that a defendant cannot obtain a Rolls-Royce with
the fruits of a crime, he cannot be permitted to obtain the
services of the Rolls-Royce of attorneys from these same
tainted funds . . . . To permit this would undermine the
purpose of forfeiture statutes, which is to strip offenders
and organizations of their economic power."
V. RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE
In Rogers, Judge Kane also considered at length the ef-
fect government efforts to forfeit attorneys' fees would have
on the defendant's right to counsel of choice. Because this
article concludes, unlike the Rogers court, that attorneys' fees
are "subject to forfeiture," the counsel of choice objection to
forfeiture of attorneys' fees is worth brief examination. This
argument by itself, however, does not warrant declaring the
1984 Act unconstitutional as applied to attorneys' fees.
The Rogers court reasoned that both a pre-trial threat of
forfeiture and an injunction or restraint on assets intended
for fees prevents the defendant from retaining counsel of
choice.9" The restraint on assets might preclude retaining
counsel of first choice from the outset, while including a pro-
vision in the indictment for forfeiture of fees could minimize
the financial appeal of defendant's case such that highly
skilled counsel might not be available at all.
Under the sixth amendment the defendant has a right,"
although not an absolute one,"9 to counsel of choice. Surely,
the right has economic limitations since we cannot say, for
96. 605 F. Supp. 839,850 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on the subpoena
issue, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
97. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348 (D.Colo. 1985).
98. See Powell v. Alabama 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (defendant should
have fair opportunity to secure counsel of own choice); Urquhart v. Lock-
hart, 726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984) (accused financially able to re-
tain counsel of own choosing must not be deprived of reasonable opportu-
nity to do so). But see United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir.
1984) (defendant failed to show that restraining order freezing assets actu-
ally restricted ability to retain counsel of choice when "counsel of choice"
already appointed under Criminal Justice Act of 1964).
99. United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1983) (uphold-
ing disqualification of defense counsel on basis of defendant's intention to
seek testimony of former client of defense counsel); Ford v. Israel, 701
F.2d 689, 692-93 (7th Cir.) (rule requiring representation by local counsel
does not deprive defendant of any sixth amendment right), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 832 (1983).
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example, that the poor have a "choice" of counsel. A court
may further limit the right. In determining whether to re-
spect the defendant's desire to retain a particular attorney as
defense counsel, it is within the court's discretion to balance
competing interests'"0 and in particular to consider the inter-
ests of the government in judicial integrity and efficiency.' 0 '
Considering the tendency among courts to weigh these
competing factors, the counsel of choice argument is not a
compelling one. A significant countervailing public interest,
like the government's interest in forfeiting the assets of crim-
inal organizations, might prevail over the defendant's interest
in retaining counsel of first choice. Until Congress establishes
clearly that public policy favors one interest over another,
the defendant's interest in counsel of choice will be subject to
a court's discretionary judgment about the relative impor-
tance of the government's interest in forfeiture.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTION TO FORFEITURE OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES
Although the Rogers court wrongly construed the 1984
Act to except from forfeiture all assets transferred by the de-
fendant in arm's length transactions for value, the forfeiture
of attorneys' fees under the 1984 Act must be consistent with
the fair trial principles implicit in the fifth and sixth amend-
ments in order to be constitutionally valid. This article argues
that the potential exists for law enforcement to seek forfei-
ture of attorneys' fees under the 1984 Act in a manner in-
consistent with the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial.
A. Fair Trial Right
The sixth amendment guarantees the defendant in a
100. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) (sixth amendment does not
guarantee "meaningful attorney-client relationship").
101. Grady v. United States, 715 F.2d 402, 404 (8th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam) (defendant's right to obtain counsel of choice balanced against
need for efficient and effective administration of criminal justice; counsel
properly withdrew when counsel's testimony important to prosecution and
change of counsel did not interfere with defendant's rights); United States
v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 828-29 (11 th Cir.) (per curiam) (defendant's in-
terest in representation by counsel of choice outweighed by likelihood that
testimony about counsel's alleged criminal activity will severely impugn in-
tegrity and credibility in eyes of jury), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 906 (1982);
United States v. Cortellesso, 663 F.2d 361, 363 (1st Cir. 1981) (defendant's
right to particular counsel does not supersede government's right to call
defendant's counsel as essential witness).
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criminal case the right to "the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense." 102 The right to counsel is absolute since it is "of
such a character that it cannot be denied without violating
those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions.' "108 Assis-
tance of counsel is essential to "render[ing] the trial a reliable
adversarial testing process."' "
Speaking recently for the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice
O'Connor remarked that the purpose of the right to counsel
is "to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial,"10'
and although "[t]he Constitution guarantees a fair trial
through the Due Process Clauses, . . . it defines the basic ele-
ments of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of
the Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel Clause." ' 10e A
102. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy . . . the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." In
some cases the performance of counsel may be so inadequate that, in ef-
fect, no assistance of counsel is provided. Clearly, in such cases, the defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to have "Assistance of Counsel" is denied.
The Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is the right
to the effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 n.14 (1970). See Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984)
(right to effective assistance relates to "whether counsel's conduct so un-
dermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."); United States v.
Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984) (ineffective assistance of counsel claim must
be supported by allegations of specific errors made by counsel).
103. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting Hebert v.
Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)). For the importance of counsel, see
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1972) (indigent defendant has
right to counsel in criminal cases, whether felony or misdemeanor); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 463 (1938) ("That which is simple, orderly and necessary to the law-
yer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate, complex and
mysterious.").
104. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.
105. Id.
That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who
have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indica-
tions of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to
counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials
in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our
state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis
on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair
trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands
equal before the law.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 344.
106. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2063. See also Scott v. United States,
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fair trial is achieved, in part, by providing the defendant with
counsel who is competent and committed to advocating the
client's interests.'0 Although the "adversarial process" does
not require that defense counsel match resources and skills
with the prosecutor,'0 8 "[t]he very premise of our adversary
system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both
sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that
the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."' 0 9 Thus,
the right to the effective assistance of counsel is the right of
the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive "the
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing."' 10 It is this adver-
sarial process, in which counsel acts in the role of advocate,
that contributes to fairness in the criminal justice system."'
As by the sixth amendment, "the defendant's right to a
fair trial [is] mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution.""' 2 The fifth amendment
prohibits deprivations of "life, liberty, or property" without
427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (noting sixth amendment standard of
counsel is more "stringent" than fifth amendment); United States v. Bur-
ton, 584 F.2d 485, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979)
(stating choice of counsel devolves from sixth amendment as well as due
process clause of fifth amendment); Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318,
1323 (5th Cir. 1978) (identifying a "right to counsel theme" of the due
process clause).
107. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2065 ("overarching duty to advocate
the defendant's cause"); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 268 (1973)
("faithful representation" of client's interests required); McMann, 397 U.S.
at 771 (accused is 'entitled to effective assistance of competent counsel).
108. "While a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants
are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a
sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators." United States ex rel. Williams
v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975)
(denial of -assistance of counsel for attorney to neglect to investigate role of
co-defendant in alleged crime).
109. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (sixth amend-
ment guarantees right to make final summation).
110. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. at 2045. "[T]he right to the assistance of
counsel has been understood to mean that there can be no restrictions
upon the function of counsel in defending a criminal prosecution in accord
with the traditions of the adversary factfinding process that has been con-
stitutionalized in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." Herring, 422
U.S. at 857.
111. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, reh'g denied, 388 U.S. 924
(1967) (indigent has right to assistance of counsel for first appeal from
criminal conviction).
112. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). See also United
States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971) (prosecutorial delay could
prejudice due process right to fair trial).
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"due process of law."11 Although "[t]he very nature of due
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures univer-
sally applicable to every imaginable situation," ' the fair trial
guarantee of the fifth amendment at least ensures the pre-
sumed innocence of the defendant in a criminal proceed-
ing,"1 6 and counsel's duty of loyalty to the client."i
B. Potential Government Abuse
Because the defendant's right to counsel of choice is a
qualified one, the reasoning of the Rogers court would be less
than persuasive if the sole effect of a government threat to
forfeit attorneys' fees was to deny the defendant counsel of
first choice. The right is not absolute. The concern that the
counsel of choice argument raises, however, is not that apply-
ing the forfeiture statute to attorneys' fees will deny the de-
fendant counsel of choice, but rather that applying the stat-
ute to attorneys' fees permits the federal prosecutor to select
defense counsel of the government's choice, or at least to re-
strict significantly the pool of available defense counsel.
Moreover, the attorney that does handle the defendant's case
must confront eternal conflicts, created by the existence of
an indictment seeking forfeiture of attorneys' fees, and which
function to jeopardize counsel's ability to render partisan ad-
vocacy. There appears to be at least a kernel of truth to the
claim that in permitting the government to pursue forfeiture
of attorneys' fees, "[t]he right to counsel will be empty be-
cause it will depend upon what government is willing to pro-
vide for a particular defendant. 1 17 This would be a practice
113. "Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole
constitutional system. While it contains the garnered wisdom of the past in
assuring fundamental justice, it is also a living principle not confined to
past instances." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 174 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
114. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961).
115. E.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 493 (1978); Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,
453 (1895) ("The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and
its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal
law.")
116. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984); Wood
v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981) (attorney must avoid conflicts of in-
terest). Professional ethics also imposes a duty of loyalty. See MODEL RuLEs
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr, Rule 1.7(b) (1983).
117. ABA Recommendation on Forfeiture, supra note 11, at 3.
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completely foreign to the criminal law, and it threatens the
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.
The objective of the new law is to provide a mechanism
for the government to confiscate the ill-gotten gains of crimi-
nal enterprise and to prevent the illegal transfer of those
gains to third parties. It would be naive to presume that law-
yers can be nothing other than "innocent" third parties and,
as a result, should be excluded from the reach of the forfei-
ture law. Thus, it is entirely consistent with the purpose and,
indeed, the language of the forfeiture law for the govern-
ment to pursue forfeiture of attorneys' fees which are paid
with tainted assets or from the proceeds of crime.11 8 Yet, this
possibility does not entail abandoning all the important pro-
tections afforded by defense counsel. In fact, a constitutional
approach to the criminal forfeiture of attorneys' fees is one
that respects the integral role of defense counsel in the ad-
versarial process. This role is not respected when the govern-
ment abuses the purpose of the forfeiture statute and maneu-
vers unilaterally to "choose" defense counsel.
Typically, RICO and CCE cases involve complex issues
and demand several years of court time at taxpayer expense.
The government draws on a substantial amount of resources
to prosecute these cases. While "fair trial" under the Consti-
tution does not require that the defendant have an equal
level of resources available for use, in evaluating what due
process requires, few courts would condone the abuse of the
adversary system which would occur if the government were
permitted to manipulate the roster of counsel available to a
defendant fighting to preserve freedom. As the Rogers court
118. This view may be unrealistic if courts follow the reasoning of
pre-1984 Act decisions. E.g., United States v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 962
(7th Cir. 1984) (denying forfeiture of fees paid to attorney since proceeds
of illegal activity were no longer in possession of defendant); United States
v. McManigal, 723 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1983) (same). The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals-has overruled these decisions in United States v. Gins-
burg, 773 F.2d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 1985). Of course not every judge agrees.
Id. at 804-07 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (objecting to the ambiguity of the for-
feiture legislation and noting that historically forfeiture has been regarded
with "deep suspicion"). Neither does the ABA, which approves of forfei-
ture only if the attorney engages in "criminal conduct" or accepts a fee as
a "fraud" or a "sham." There is no indication under the ABA proposal
that acceptance of fees paid from proceeds of crime would amount to
"criminal conduct," "fraud," or "sham." Interestingly, prosecutor might
avoid the obstacles of criminal forfeiture and seek remedial forfeiture of
fees under a civil statute. See United States v. One Parcel of Land, 614 F.
Supp. 183 (N.D. II1. 1985).
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recognized, "government would possess the ultimate tactical
advantage of being able to exclude competent defense coun-
sel as it chooses. By appending a charge of forfeiture to an
indictment under RICO, the prosecutor could exclude those
defense counsel which he felt to be skilled adversaries.''1
Essentially, the notice of forfeiture, including fees, places
in the lap of defense counsel the decision of whether to risk
providing services without receiving compensation because of
an inability to prove that counsel was unaware of the
"tainted" source of the attorneys' fee. Arguably, few lawyers
would take this risk. The point, then, is not that forfeiture of
attorneys' fees prevents the defendant from retaining counsel
of first choice. Rather, the critical point is that the prosecutor
can use the threat of forfeiture of fees to reduce the pool of
counsel available to the defendant. Economic interests alone
will preclude much of the private bar from taking the case in
which the government wants to forfeit attorneys' fees.1 20
Sentiments of equality might support the argument that
a RICO or CCE defendant, who cannot muster enough credi-
bility to convince an attorney that the accused possesses
"clean" assets to pay a fee, should resort to the public de-
fender's office, just like the indigent who has no assets. That
argument, however, fails to consider the potential for abuse
in the statute. Certainly, if a criminal defendant has no
"clean" assets to retain private counsel, then the defendant
can secure the services of a public defender. The source of
abuse, however, lies in the indictment itself and in what mes-
sage the indictment or restraining order conveys. The mes-
sage conveyed is that attorneys' fees will come from assets
which are presumed to be forfeitable. The effect is that such
notice of forfeiture of fees functions to deter potential de-
fense counsel from taking the case before the attorney is capa-
ble of making a rational decision whether or not the defend-
ant can pay fees from a legitimate source. In achieving such a
result, the government has taken long strides toward exclud-
ing the best available defense counsel from particular cases
(assuming an economic motivation) and possibly leaving the
defendant with the services of the typically overburdened
119. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1350.
120. Nonetheless, a lawyer could get reasonable compensation set by
Congress for attorneys appointed under the Criminal Justice Act. 18
U.S.C.A. § 3006A (1985). Congress has doubled the rate to $60 per hour
for time expended in court and to $40 per hour for out-of-court services.
Moreover, it is possible that there would be no limit on the maximum
amount an attorney may receive for representation in complex cases.
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public defender."' This result is possible even though the de-
fendant may have legitimate resources for payment of fees.
C. Attorney-Client Conflicts
The defendant's fair trial interests are jeopardized fur-
ther insofar as the threat of forfeiture of fees manufactures
conflicts of interest and impairs the attorney's ability to be a
partisan advocate. Although such a result implicates the at-
torney-client privilege, a certain level of conflict imperils the
attorney's ability to fulfill the duty of loyalty owed to the cli-
ent under the Constitution. To the extent that the 1984 Act
permits the government to create this conflict unilaterally by
pursuing forfeiture of attorneys' fees, the statute is unconsti-
tutional as applied.
As Judge Kane opined in Rogers, "[t]he threat of an at-
torney having to disclose information obtained from his cli-
ent will chill the openness of those communications, thereby
impinging on the right to counsel. ' 12 ' The court concluded,
in effect, the post-trial ancillary hearing established in the
121. This line of argument does not necessarily apply with equal
weight to the issue of using grand jury subpoenas to obtain client fee infor-
mation from attorneys. Compare Simels v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on the subpoena issue, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985)
(grand jury subpoena issued only three months after retracted trial sub-
poena looks like abuse of grand jury process), with Doe v. United States,
781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1986) (en banc) (denying motion to quash subpoena
since value of attorney's testimony regarding prior fee arrangements with
former client outweighs the danger that the grand jury appearance would
disqualify attorney from representing the client again), vacating Doe v.
United States, 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985) (requiring a preliminary show-
ing of relevance and search for alternative sources). One basic distinction
between the threat of fees forfeiture and the potential for attorney disqual-
ification by issuing a grand jury subpoena is that the subpoena may deny
the defendant of, at most, one particular attorney. The threat of forfei-
ture, on the other hand, could severely limit the field from which a defend-
ant chooses counsel.
The Justice Department has issued a "Policy With Regard to the Issu-
ance of Grand Jury or Trial Subpoenas to Attorneys for Information Re-
lating to the Representation of Clients," which requires obtaining informa-
tion from alternative sources "unless such efforts would compromise a
criminal investigation or prosecution." 37 GRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2480 (Sept.
25, 1985). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, by disciplinary rule,
has required prosecutors to secure judicial approval prior to issuing sub-
poenas of defense lawyers. See Weiner, Federal Grand Jury Subpoenas to At-
torneys: A Proposal for Reform, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 95 (1985); New Rule Set
on Lawyer Subpoenas, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 4, 1985, at 3; U.S. Acts to Block a Curb
on Subpoenas to Lawyers, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 3, 1986, at 9, col. 1.
122. 602 F. Supp. at 1349.
[Vol. 2
FORFEITURE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
1984 Act would require a disclosure of how the attorney
knew assets for fees were not part of a sham transaction. This
disclosure, according to the court, would necessarily encom-
pass privileged attorney-client communication. The possibil-
ity of disclosure in the future would have the present effect
of chilling open communications between attorney and
client. 123
The underlying theory of the attorney-client privilege is
that "encouraging clients to make the fullest disclosure to
their attorneys enables the latter to act more effectively,
justly, and expeditiously."112 ' The privilege functions by deny-
ing compulsion of attorney testimony about protected com-
munications between the attorney and the client. Generally,
the privilege extends to confidential communications made
for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional
legal services to the client. 25 To be privileged, the communi-
cation must be confidential, and it must be necessary to ob-
tain informed legal advice. 12 6
Because the privilege prevents disclosure of relevant evi-
dence, it must be "strictly confined within the narrowest pos-
sible limits consistent with the logic of its principle. 1 2 7 In de-
fining the limits, courts have held that client identity and fee
information, although incriminating, generally are not privi-
leged since the fact of identity and payment of a fee are not
"confidential communications" and, therefore, cannot be
privileged information. 28
123. Accord United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (questioning legality of subpoena for attorney fee informa-
tion). But see Simels v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
rev'd on the subpoena issue, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985) (grand jury subpoena
issued only three months after retracted trial subpoena looks like abuse of
grand jury process), rejecting the Rogers court view on forfeiture of fees,
on attorney-client privilege, and on sixth amendment.
124. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE § 503(02) (1985); Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (for fully informed legal advice
client must confide in attorney); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470
(1888) (interests of justice require client to utilize attorney's service with-
out fear of subsequent disclosure).
125. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2295 (3d ed. 1940).
126. In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding denial of
motion to quash subpoena requesting fee information).
127. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403 (holding the production of accountants'
workpapers does not involve testimonial self-incrimination under the fifth
amendment); Shargel, 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984),(identification of persons
as clients of an attorney does not disclose a confidential communication).
128. Shargel, 742 F.2d at 64 (privilege only encompasses communica-
tions necessary to obtain informed legal advice); In re Witnesses Before
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Nearly every opponent of applying forfeiture to attor-
neys' fees has argued that the statutory scheme of the third
party hearing violates the attorney-client privilege.12 9 As apetitioner for fees in a post-trial hearing'" the attorney
would have to establish the basis for believing assets used for
fees were not subject to forfeiture.
Although the statute would not require the attorney to
scrutinize every financial transaction ever made by the de-
fendant, the law probably should be interpreted to contem-
plate a reasonable inquiry into the source of the professional
fee. It is improbable, for example, that the attorney could be-
lieve property was not subject to forfeiture if the defendant
offered to pay the fee in small-numbered bills out of a brown
paper bag. Of course, the unique role of the attorney, which
may entail having intimate knowledge of a client's personal
and business affairs, demands a more thorough inquiry than
could be expected from the average third party."' The attor-
ney of a longstanding attorney-client relationship, for in-
stance, may have little or no trouble indicating which facts
and circumstances contributed to forming a belief that the
source of a legal fee would not be subject to forfeiture, and
in so indicating, the attorney need not disclose communica-
tions protected by the privilege.
Even if the statutory scheme imposes requirements ulti-
mately beneficial to the profession,132 it may be practically
impossible for an attorney to present information which in-
Special Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489, 491 (7th Cir. 1984) (fee information
privileged only if so much is already known that its disclosure would reveal
a confidential communication); In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.
1983) (disclosure of amount of fees not privileged).
129. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1348-49; Buffone, supra note 10, at 146;
Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 9, at 740-42.
130. The attorney must meet the requirements of a "bona fide pur-
chaser for value." 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6)(B); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B).
The attorney, of course, does not "purchase" anything but in fact "sells"
services. The attorney, nevertheless, is considered on the level of a pur-
chaser for purposes of the third party hearing.
131. The typical grocery store checker, for instance, would not sus-
pect impropriety on the part of a customer merely because payment was in
small-numbered bills.
132. The forfeiture law forces the issue of whether attorneys should
accept fees paid out of the profits of criminal activity. For a thorough criti-
cism of prevailing ethical norms and advocacy of "personal ethics," see Si-
mon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978
Wisc. L. REV. 29. See also Heffernan, The Moral Accountability of Advocates,
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 36 (1985) (denying unaccountability for conduct
merely on basis of conforming to codes of professional conduct).
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sures a right to the professional fee without revealing privi-
leged communications. If nothing else, ongoing breaches of
the attorney-client privilege which result solely by operation
of a statutory scheme provide support for the view that the
procedure is inimical to partisan advocacy. Perhaps ulti-
mately, repeated violations provide solid evidence that the
defendant is denied the fair trial guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Apart from the attorney-client privilege concerns, the
conflict fostered by the statute may cause the attorney to be
less than a zealous advocate of the client's interests; in order
to preserve the right to fees, communication with the client
may be intentionally limited. Consider that the Federal Rules
permit an indictment reference to "all property" of the de-
fendant. 88 Consider, also, that one route for proving contin-
uing criminal enterprise is to show evidence of the defend-
ant's "legal" income and resources compared to what the
defendant has spent. How can defense counsel zealously de-
fend against such an approach while taking care to remain
partially ignorant of the defendant's financial background in
order to protect the right to attorneys' fees? Such a balancing
act suggests that the attorney and client have adverse inter-
ests, which is just the kind of conflict lying at the root of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.'"
As Judge Leval in United States v. Badalamenti described
the dilemma encountered by defense counsel: "His obligation
to be well informed on the subject of his client's case would
133. The government's indictment must allege what is subject to for-
feiture. "No judgment of forfeiture may be entered in a criminal proceed-
ing unless the indictment or information shall allege the extent of the in-
terest or property subject to forfeiture." FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2).
Courts have upheld a general reference to "all property," however, as
long as the indictment would give adequate notice to the defendant to mar-
shal evidence for defending against the proposed forfeiture. E.g., United
States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1983) (supplementing indict-
ment with bill of particulars describing property); United States v. Gram-
matikos, 633 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1980) (forfeiting a yacht and a dis-
cotheque-motel located in Chalkis, Greece).
134. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (reversing con-
viction for attorney's failure to account for adverse interests of co-defend-
ants); Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1984) (denial of fair
trial rights when attorney acted as witness for prosecution); United States
v. De Falco, 644 F.2d 132, 136-37 (3rd Cir. 1979) (denial of sixth amend-
ment rights when counsel under indictment and entered plea bargain on
his case in same court hearing client's case). The defendant is entitled to
the "undivided loyalty" of counsel. W. LA FAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE § 11.9 (1985).
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conflict with his interest in not learning facts that would en-
danger his fee by telling him his fee was the proceeds of ille-
gal activity." '1 85 More broadly, it is argued that the sense of
trust and confidence in a relationship between attorney and
client is impaired by the prospect that an attorney may be-
come a witness against the client in the pending
prosecution.a e
These conflicts are great and amount to a significant bur-
den on defense counsel. In sum, government application of
the 1984 Act to attorneys' fees threatens seriously defense
counsel's ability to maintain the duty of loyalty owed to the
defendant.
Although the Justice Department has claimed it will not
seek fee forfeitures unless the prosecutor can prove a defense
lawyer has "actual knowledge" that the source of the profes-
sional fee is an asset "from criminal misconduct, '11 7 an intra-
departmental policy of restraint, accountable to nobody, is
not the kind of protection upon which a defendant should
have to rely in the face of such risk for abuse." A procedure
which bestows upon the government the means to reduce sig-
nificantly the number and the loyalty of available defense
counsel is one which does not appear to be consistent with
the fair trial guarantee of the Constitution." 9
VII. PROPOSED AMENDMENT
Considering the risk of depriving the right to a fair trial,
135. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196.
136. E.g., Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 9, at 742. See Virgin Is-
lands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 139 (3d Cir. 1984). This claim relates to the
broader notion of duty of confidentiality: "A lawyer shall not reveal infor-
mation relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after
consultation ...... MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1983). The claim also pertains to the advocate-witness rule which bars at-
torneys from appearing in litigation as both advocate and witness, MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-9 (1981). See United States v.
Prantil, 764 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1985) (prosecutor barred from testifyng by
advocate-witness rule).
137. Justice Department Guidelines on Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees, 38
CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001 (Oct. 2, 1985).
138. The Guidelines place no "limitations on otherwise lawful litiga-
tive prerogratives of the Department of Justice," and are for strictly inter-
nal purposes. Id. at 3003.
139. Basic interests of a free community may hinge largely on the
vitality of the adversary system. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8-
11 (1963).
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the benefit of additional procedural safeguards could prove
to be invaluable. The 1984 Act should be amended to pro-
vide for a pre-trial hearing whenever the government gives
notice of an intention to forfeit attorneys' fees. The pre-trial
hearing, along with the jury decision at trial, would decide all
issues relating to fees and would obviate the need for the
post-trial third-party hearing provisions to decide on claims
for attorneys' fees.
A. Pre-Trial Hearing and a Reasonable Fee
The safeguard of a pre-trial hearing to decide the fees
issue should involve little additional burden relative to the
benefits offered. The requirement would not be unduly bur-
densome in view of the already existing provision for a pre-
trial hearing on restraining orders. Moreover, the defendant
receives the benefit of having a judicial officer decide the
kind of legal representation the defendant receives through-
out trial. Other arbitrary factors, including speculation and
prosecutorial aggressiveness, are eliminated. The govern-
ment, at the same time, can pursue its forfeiture objectives
without uncertainty about the constitutionality of the
conduct.
Furthermore, when forfeiture of fees is an issue at a pre-
trial hearing, the defendant should be able to pay a "reasona-
ble fee" 140 for legal services performed prior to and in the
course of the hearing. A reasonable fee provision is essential
to the hearing requirement since it assures that the defend-
ant in a pre-trial hearing receives adequate representation,
which is not necessarily guaranteed by the existing Forfeiture
Act.1 41
140. This is a "reasonable fee" in the ordinary sense, not limited by
the "cap" of the appointed counsel provision, supra note 120. In its discre-
tion, a court may allow the prevailing party in a federal civil rights action a
"reasonable attorney's fee." 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Courts have a great deal of
experience in applying the many factors used to determine what is "reason-
able." See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
141. As I have discussed earlier, the mere threat of forfeiture may
dissuade attorneys from accepting a case even if only to prepare for a pre-
trial hearing. It may be argued that the defendant should have access to
assets, both legally and illegally acquired, to offset "ordinary and necessary
expenses" which presumably would include the cost of counsel.
Any income accruing to, or derived from, an enterprise or an in-
terest in an enterprise which has been ordered forfeited under
this section may be used to offset ordinary and necessary expenses
to the enterprise which are required by law, or which are neces-
sary to protect the interests of the United States or third parties.
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When the government petitions the court toissue a pre-
trial restraining order on the defendant's assets, ordinarily
the.Forfeiture Act requires a hearing to determine whether
the order should issue or remain in effect. 142 If the order also
restrains assets intended to pay attorneys' fees, as it would if
reference is made to "all assets," then, by definition, the
hearing on the order should also address the question of
whether and to what extent the defendant has assets to use
for attorneys' fees. To date, courts have not made such a de-
termination, preferring instead to address only the broader,
preliminary issue of whether fees can be seized at all. 143 Nev-
ertheless, at this stage, already the risk exists that an innocent
defendant could be deprived of the quality of legal represen-
tation that can be afforded out of legitimate assets. The hear-
ing on the order, therefore, not only should determine the
validity of the order but also should determine specifically
what the defendant can use to retain counsel after the hear-
ing and during the trial. Meanwhile, the defendant should be
allowed access to resources sufficient to pay a "reasonable
fee" for legal services relating to the hearing.
Where the government, by way of indictment, indicates
its interest in forfeiting fees but does not petition for a pre-
trial restraint of assets, again the risk exists that the defend-
18 U.S.C. § 1963(f). See also 21 U.S.C. §853(g).
Assuming an argument along these lines would propose a "reasonable
fee" for the attorney, it would differ from my proposal only in the event
that the pre-trial hearing rendered a decision that the defendant owned
insufficient assets to retain counsel. In this event, however, the difference
in dollars can be substantial. My proposal would allow the defendant to pay
a "reasonable fee," supra note 140, for the services relating to the pre-trial
hearing, but would allow the defendant only the services of "appointed
counsel," supra note 120, for the remainder of the trial. Permitting the
defendant to pay "reasonable fees" or the "going market rate" for legal
services, without regard for the lack of "clean" assets, would result in pay-
ment of a fee much higher than what I have proposed. More importantly,
such a result highlights one of the underlying themes of this paper; if with
some proof it is shown that a defendant owns insufficient "clean" assets to
retain counsel, then the defendant may have access to the level of counsel
which is ordinarily available to indigents: a public defender. Moreover, my
proposal discards the post-trial, third-party hearing only when attorneys'
fees are an issue.
142. A restraining order could issue upon the filing of an indictment
or information, without a prior hearing. Earlier, I questioned the constitu-
tionality of restraining property without a hearing. Supra notes 87-90 and
accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1347 (D.
Colo. 1985).
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ant will be deprived of the quality of counsel that legitimately
can be afforded. The defendant may have assets readily avail-
able for retaining counsel, but many attorneys would con-
sider the risk of fee seizure to be high, and as a result, would
be reluctant to take a case in which the government has indi-
cated an interest in forfeiture of attorneys' fees. A court,
therefore, should conduct a pre-trial hearing on the question
of whether the defendant has assets to use toward attorneys'
fees. Accordingly, the defendant should be entitled to use as-
sets sufficient to pay a reasonable legal fee for services relat-
ing to the hearing.
B. Substantial Probability Standard
The rules which prevail at the hearing must be sensitive
to, on the one hand, the prosecution's reluctance to reveal
too much of its principal case, and on the other hand, both
the presumed innocence of the defendant and the presumed
legitimate pool of resources out of which the defendant pays
legal fees. Almost certainly, if the government must jeopard-
ize its efforts to secure a conviction in order to forfeit attor-
neys' fees, the prosecution will abandon the forfeiture count
and instead exclusively pursue the conviction. A hearing
which does not account for this governmental interest, there-
fore, is one which does a disservice to law enforcement's
long-term efforts to curtail crime-for-profit activities. Equally
ineffective, however, is a hearing which deprives a defendant
of the presumed legitimacy of assets owned. Such a hearing
could impair the defendant's ability to retain counsel.
In light of these, interests, a "substantial probability"
standard of proof should prevail at the hearing on the issue
of attorneys' fees.1 4" Aside from the fact that a pre-trial re-
straining order similarly can issue only upon a "substantial
144. "The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embod-
ied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to 'instruct
the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type
of adjudication.'" Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). For an
interesting introduction to the analogous area of preliminary injunctions,
compare American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd., 780
F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1985) (Judge Posner's formula for "presenting suc-
cinctly" the factors a court must consider), with Leubsdorf, The Standard
for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1978) (balance gravity of
interim injury against possibility of interlocutory judicial error).
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probability" showing,4 5 the purpose of requiring this burden
is two-fold. First, it is far short of "beyond a reasonable
doubt," or even "clear and convincing," which in this con-
text would amount to full disclosure or free, open discovery
of the prosecution's case prior to trial.14 Second, the burden
of proof is high enough to discourage the almost casual gov-
ernment request for attorneys' fees-a practice which could
become appealing to prosecutors under the current statutory
scheme. Congress has recognized that the test of "substantial
probability" is a "stringent one,""" and it would require the
prosecution to present some convincing indicia of wrongdo-
ing, or to show that there is a "substantial probability" that
the defendant has committed a crime, that the defendant has
assets subject to forfeiture and that attorneys' fees will be
paid from those assets. The prosecution might meet this bur-
den by showing the likelihood that the defendant will be con-
victed of a crime, and the fact of a high retainer fee in a
situation where the defendant has little or no reported in-
come and no other significant, legitimate financial or family
assistance.
C. Derivative Use Immunity
The pre-trial hearing may require the defendant to tes-
tify, and although the proceeding is pre-indictment, fifth
amendment protections against self-incrimination probably
should apply. A useful procedural tool, therefore, would be
the grant of derivative use immunity to the defendant at the
hearing. Anything disclosed at the hearing could not be used
in the principal case, unless the government could show that
it obtained the evidence from an independent, legitimate
source. 148
145. Supra note 84.
146. Not only is the government not expected to disclose trial strat-
egy but important societal interests, such as protection of witnesses, are
served by a policy of limited criminal discovery. See, e.g., United States v.
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 625 (5th Cir. 1982) (murder of government wit-
nesses); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(i) (grant of protective order on showing to
court alone).
147. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 203.
148. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (finding grant
of derivative use immunity consistent with fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination). See generally L. TAYLOR, WITNESS IMMUNITY
(1983).
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D. Effect of Hearing and Jury Decisions
If at the pre-trial hearing the court decides the defend-
ant owns sufficient legitimate resources from which to pay
counsel, or for the same reason, decides not to restrain any of
the defendant's assets, then the defendant has no constraints
in using whatever assets the defense requires. If the court, on
the other hand, determines that some or all of the defend-
ant's assets are "subject to forfeiture" or pre-trial restraint,
then the defendant must proceed to trial accordingly, even if
only accompanied by a public defender. The restraint on as-
sets may preclude the defendant from offering a retainer,
whereas the hearing decision that assets may be subject to
forfeiture gives notice of the likelihood that fees will be for-
feited, and as a result, probably reduces the attraction of the
defendant's case among potential defense counsel. More than
likely, the hearing decision would have a lasting impact on
the defendant's ability to retain quality counsel.
The jury decision at trial controls whether any of the de-
fendant's assets are forfeited in fact. If the jury decides that
none of the defendant's assets should be forfeited, then the
defendant may use whatever is required to pay counsel even
though counsel already has rendered the services. With this
in mind, defense counsel may decide to provide services, de-
spite a pre-trial decision suggesting fees would be subject to
forfeiture, because of the view that the government's evi-
dence would not persuade a jury to order forfeiture of fees.
On the other hand, if the jury decides that some or all of the
defendant's assets are to be forfeited, then the defendant's
ability to pay counsel is constrained accordingly. The govern-
ment may forfeit assets already transferred to the attorney,
but in any event, the government may not reach the "reason-
able fee" the attorney receives for services rendered prior to
and during the hearing.
The primary benefit of this approach is two-fold. First,
the proposed amendment guarantees the defendant access to
counsel. The guaranteed "reasonable fee" provision allows
defense counsel to consider the merits of the government's
case without the threat of fee forfeiture. Second, an impartial
judicial system, rather than the local prosecutor, bears the re-
sponsibility of depriving a defendant in a criminal case of the
ability to retain private counsel.
CONCLUSION
The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 represents
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Congress's latest attempt to do something about the substan-
tial economic clout exerted by criminal racketeers and drug
traffickers. In the view of Congress, criminal forfeiture is the
mechanism through which law enforcement may make a
worthwhile attack on the profit-generating apparatus forming
the lifeblood of these organizations. The efforts of Congress
in this area deserve praise. This article has concluded that a
generally commendable forfeiture law may have an adverse
effect on a defendant's right to a fair trial when the prosecu-
tion seeks to forfeit attorneys' fees. In recommending that
the forfeiture statute be amended, this article attempts to
outline an approach to forfeiture of attorneys' fees consistent
with the constitutional protections guaranteed to defendants
in the criminal justice system.
